Fragile Nation (Tanveer Ahmed) p23-4
The Pew Survey has repeatedly shown that virtually every ethnic or religious group become less religious after migrating to the West, except for Muslims who as a group tend to become more religious. In spite of some aspects of Muslim behaviour being cultural expressions of broader patterns, there also appear to be some unique trends peculiar to the Islamic community.
French academic Olivier Roy in his book Globalised Islam writes of the notion of identity Islam, a modern version of Islamic practice undertaken by Muslims growing up in the West. They are unique in history in that their practice of Islam is de-territorialised – not tied to any geography or pre-existing culture. This is where they are in fact rebelling against their parents’ version of religious practice which they perceive as stained by cultural traditions. Their parents’ combination of culture, nationalism and religion were not in opposition, unlike those growing up in countries like Australia or Britain.
The rejection of culture is central to the notion, for they believe there is a true Islam that exists pristine and pure stripped from any cultural strains. This is arguably a fiction for no religion can exist without a local, cultural dimension, but not unlike others trying to find stronger links with nature through food or medicine, it was another version of a search for purity.
I would often have long chats with Jamil as he began to improve and was interested in his religious views. He spoke of his attachment to the “ummah”, which referred to the international community of believers. It was an imagined community but he felt it strongly, identifying with the Palestinians and even Bosnians in Eastern Europe. What did he have in common with Slavs in the Eastern Bloc I wondered? But in a time of a diluted notion of community, it was this kind of imagined community that held appeal. I also couldn’t help thinking that the notion of a global, oppressed class of Muslims from Palestine to France to the Philippines sounded awfully like the international working class motif of Marxism. During my conversations with Jamil sometimes I felt like Lenin had been reincarnated as a skinny Pakistani boy who also liked Kanye West.
American sociologist Marcia Hermansen ran a study almost a decade ago looking at Muslim youth across American university campuses. What she found was that Muslim religiosity was primarily a defence mechanism to ward off the hurt of unbelonging. She writes:
One can imagine the problems of Muslim youth, often isolated by having distinctive names, physical appearance, and being associated with a stigmatized culture and religion. No wonder the concept that they were actually the superior ones, fending off the corrupt and evil society around them, rang pleasant.
It was a bit like breaking up first with a boyfriend or girlfriend fearing they were about to break up with you. Instead of feeling rejected by mainstream society, Muslims through their religiosity rejected the mainstream. Theirs was a social protest. Rather than feeling socially awkward, unattractive or unable to mix, they could believe they were morally superior and project any sense of hurt outwards through accusations of racism and discrimination. This is not to say such mistreatment doesn’t exist, but there is plenty 0f evidence to suggest the rejection and self-segregation begins with Muslims first.