From The River at the Centre of the World (Simon Winchester, 1996) pp175-9
It did not take long for the British East India Company to get involved in the tea trade and to try to convince the Chinese otherwise. In 1669, the supercargoes on company ships were buying cases of Chinese tea in Java — where it was cultivated, as it was in Japan and Formosa. By 1686, they were purchasing it in Canton itself. Such was the rocketing demand for the leaf in England (and so huge were the tax revenues that the British government found it could earn by levying duty both at home and on the tea exported to their colonies, like North America) that the company made huge profits. Its agents began to buy so many tons of tea from the Canton merchants that it established a near monopoly, bitterly contested by other foreigners. A new generation of ships — the magnificent tea clippers — were built in yards in London and all around the English coast to supply the huge demand: they would speed home from the China coast with hundreds of tons of tea aboard, and with additional tons of Chinese porcelain for ballast.
But before long an embarrassing question arose: how exactly were the Chinese to be paid for all this tea? In the early days they had been happy to accept copper, one of the few minerals in which the Empire was then deficient. They would also accept gold, though they preferred silver. Yet by the middle of the eighteenth century the demand for tea had swollen to such a level that London, already near bankrupted by its European wars, found it could no longer afford to pay in metal of any kind. The company men offered paper money, but the Chinese were disdainful. They said they had no use for such stuff and distrusted it, viewing it quite sensibly as merely a promise of payment made by men quite probably unreliable. To the Chinese, it was just a new piece of foreign devilry.
Caught in a money trap, men can do terrible things. The British were caught, and terrible things they promptly did — deciding as an act of East India Company policy that the tea trade with Canton should in future be balanced by selling the Chinese the one commodity that the peasantry appeared urgently to need — the dried, fermented, and pressed juice of the head of the Indian white poppy: opium.
This drug had been declared illegal by China in 1729. Growing, supplying or smoking it were ultimately to become capital offences. But it was an identifiable need, a popular craving, and once Britain had identified it as such, so the purveyors — and in the early days the monopoly belonged to the company — exploited the craving to the hilt. Patna and Benares and the other great opium-growing centres in India began to produce the flat brown cakes or four-pound cannonballs of pressed opium by the hundreds: sixty tons in 1776, three hundred in 1790. It was then but a short trip to take it from Calcutta to Canton — opium ships ran a virtual shuttle-service in the summer, running the drug from Indian godown to Chinese godown and selling at an incredible profit.
Chinese tea was sold to the British for sixty dollars a ton. For the same amount of money the Chinese merchants could buy just half a box of the opium — one layer from a standard Patna box, with twenty four—pound balls sealed in pitch and sewn up in a gunnysack. It was, from the British point of view, a perfect trade – a true licence to print money. And while the East India Company made the first good money, its own monopoly was eventually weakened and broken — after which time magnificent baronies grew up in London, headed by men who could count their cash ten thousand miles away from where their dirty trade was done, and who were making profits quite as fast and as furiously as do the cocaine bosses of Colombia three centuries later.
There was a signal difference between then and now, however. While the Colombians are today condemned all around the world, firms in Victorian times, like Jardine, Matheson & Co. and their main rivals Lancelot Dent and Company, the American firm of Russell & Co., a lone British entrepreneur named Innes and the Parsi trader Heerjeebhoy Rustornjee, were all handsomely and officially rewarded for their business — of which opium dealing produced the greatest profit. They were able to accumulate an impressive storehouse, one that in many cases is maintained today, of respectability, political power, influence and official honours.
The almost fantastic cascade of political consequences of the opium trade, and China’s attempts to ban it and thus curb the westerners’ profiteering, are well known. They included two vicious wars between Britain and China, any number of manifestly unequal treaties that were then imposed on the vanquished Chinese (such as that signed back on HMS Cornwallis, moored in mid-Yangtze off Nanjing in 1842), the cession of Hong Kong to Britain, the steady slicing away of China (the Shandong peninsula going to Germany, Port Arthur to Russia, the Manchurian railway concession to Japan, Port Edward to Britain, and so on), its invasion by soldiers from Europe, the Americas, and Japan, the fall of the Manchu dynasty, the fall of the Republic, the creation of the People’s Republic. It is by no means stretching things to say that the opium trade led more or less directly to the dropping of the atomic bomb as well — for once the Japanese had found themselves able to defeat the war-weakened Chinese at battle, to annex Manchuria and to invade and occupy fully half of the Empire, so they found an increasing confidence in their own belief that they should rule the Pacific, and began promptly to try to do so, overrunning Malaya and Burma, bombing Pearl Harbor.
And if all in the name of opium, then all in the name of tea. The Chinese sent other products too — rhubarb and silk and the kentledge-ballast of which porcelain was the main part. But tea was what the fuss was really all about, and opium was needed to pay for it. Never, at least in this context, was there a more appropriate metaphor than a tempest in a teacup.
But there was one further complication, and an unkind irony it was. The very Chinese tea industry whose existence sparked all of this was itself eventually consumed and virtually destroyed by those who had been its greatest patrons. The British all but ruined China, and on the way they set about ruining its tea business with a vengeance, too.
This happened because of a chance discovery that was made in 1820 by the new commissioner of Cooch Behar in India – the finding of a plant, not seen before. The new commissioner sent samples of it down to Calcutta, where it was received by a young and ambitious Dane named Nathaniel Wallich, who had just been appointed botanist to the Government of India. He suspected what was later confirmed in London: the plant was Camellia sinenis, the tea tree, and it grew in abundance in Assam. It was not, however, used by any of the locals as an infusion. No Indian of the time drank tea. That was all to change, drastically.
Tea, it was realized by the British, would grow as well in the hills of eastern India as it already did in the hills of western China. From the British colonists’ point of view this presented a perfect opportunity. For India was their territory, and they could henceforth grow their crop on what they believed to be their land. In less than thirty years from Wallich’s identification, tea plants were being cultivated and processed in India on a prodigious scale, on sprawling plantations, their managements British, their factories equipped with English machinery and European efficiency. A new industry had been established. A new subculture, that of the planter—wallah, had been created.
In all those places where Englishmen ruled — Assam, Darjeeling, Bengal, Burma, Ceylon – the very same plants that were being farmed so secretly and primitively across the border in Yunnan and Sichuan were being made to turn out twice as much tea in a third of the time for a quarter the cost of labour. Where the Yangtze valley had for all history been the capital of tea, it was now, thanks to the foreigners, the turn of the Valley of the Brahmaputra.
The Chinese monopoly — until that time broken only by Japan, Formosa and some enterprising Javans — was now ripped asunder. The Yangtze treaty ports — Jiujiang down below me here, and Hankou just a day’s sailing upstream — continued to be important bases for tea sales only for another few years. By the time the Suez Canal was opened to traffic in 1869, it made sound commercial sense for Europe to buy all its teas from India. They were cheaper, of better quality, and they were rushed to the London markets with dispatch. From henceforth what was called in the drawing room ‘China tea’ was to be a product of the tea industry of the Indian Empire, and all profit was to be made by the English traders and all taxes paid to the English Crown. The China tea industry was brought back to the condition it had been in before the Portuguese traders first came to Canton: it was in business to supply just the Emperor and his people.
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p213
The West has been trying things out on the people of Wuhan for decades — test marketing them much as they might do in Nottingham or Chicago. It is said that, among other things, the Gatling gun, the fedora, basketball, steam engines and the notions of unionized labour and representative democracy were all first tested on the people of Wuhan. Opium, however, was not among the items that the West introduced to Wuhan, or to China. The trade that grew up between British India and China, which was explained in the previous chapter, was created to satisfy — or to exploit, depending on your point of View — an already existing habit. The Indian opium augmented an already very considerable domestic harvest. Even as late as 1908, a trade report for Hankou showed, for instance, that while 34,000 pounds of opium had been landed in the port from the Indian regions of Patna and Malwa, some 65,000 pounds had come downstream, from the Chinese poppy fields of Yunnan and Sichuan. The point is often forgotten: the Chinese were already heavy users of the drug by the time the British traders moved in and, like the Mafia, sought to dominate and control the trade.
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