Tgk1946's Blog

From Without America (QE68, Hugh White 2017) pp52-3, 56-7

… tinged with populist xenophobia. They have nudged both government and Opposition to start raising concerns about China’s growing power more frankly than they have been prepared to do before.

At the same time, Donald Trump’s presidency has undermined Canberra’s confidence both in America’s future in Asia, and in Washington’s regard for Australia as an ally. Policy-makers were shocked when it became clear after the election that Trump would be as bad a president as everyone had feared, and that his commitment to Asia could not be taken for granted. Even more shocking was the realisation that Trump cared nothing for the alliance. His abusive first phone call with Malcolm Turnbull soon after the inauguration in January overturned Canberra’s assumptions about how the two countries communicate, and raised real concerns that, for the first time in living memory, the US president simply didn’t care about Australia. Canberra’s instinct has been to try to turn this around. This too has nudged the government to start talking more frankly about China than it ever did in Obama’s time. It seems that Trump has finally made those in Canberra realise how fragile America’s position in Asia is, and so they have now decided to encourage Trump to stand up to China, and to see Australia as a valuable ally in doing this.

This explains Malcolm Turnbull’s and Julie Bishop’s more forthright remarks in Singapore earlier this year. It also explains the strange and sad spectacle of the Australian government trying to pretend that Donald Trump is anything like a normal president leading a competent administration. Most significantly, it may explain Turnbull’s extraordinary decision to offer Donald Trump unqualified support in his threats to launch a war against North Korea. Such a war would probably and quickly become the worst the world has seen in many decades, and Donald Trump is the last person in the world to be trusted with a blank cheque on such a matter. The costs to Australia of encouraging Trump to launch such a war, and of joining in ourselves, could be immense.

The Turnbull commitment was made in a few lines during a radio interview. From what he said, there is no evidence that he or his government had given the matter any serious thought. In his very brief statements since then, the prime minister has said nothing about the circumstances under which such a war could be justified, and nothing to explain why taking part in it would serve Australia’s interests, beyond the fact that we are America’s ally. Never before in our history has a government so blithely committed Australia to such a momentous strategic action with so little thought or explanation. It is not clear why Turnbull did it, but the most likely reason was to bolster Trump’s regard for Australia as an ally, as Turnbull and his colleagues become more and more worried about China. One wonders if it worked: knowing Trump, probably not.
—
It might seem absurd that ministers who baulk at a freedom of navigation operation in the South China Sea are nonetheless willing to contemplate joining a major war there, but it fits the pattern of thoughtless tough talk on national security which has become so central to our politics since 2001. Turnbull’s eager promise to support Trump over North Korea showed how far this has now gone, and confirms the government’s breezy eagerness to talk up our willingness to go to war without thinking about what that might involve.
Malcolm Turnbull didn’t always think this way. Back in 2011 he criticised the 2009 defence white paper’s premise “that we should base our defence planning and procurement on the contingency of a naval war with China in the South China Sea.” But that is just what he is now doing.

Still, one wonders how the conversation would run in Canberra if our Situation Room scenario played out differently, and Malcolm Turnbull got a call from the president asking Australia to send forces to join an escalating war with China in the South China Sea, say, or over Taiwan. No one talks about this much in Canberra, but it is a very important question. The consensus is that he, or any other prime minister, would almost certainly say yes, “simply because he would have no choice.”

I think that is quite wrong. The prime minister would certainly have a choice, although it would not ‘be an easy one. Saying no would weaken, and perhaps destroy, the alliance on which we depend. Saying yes would plunge Australia into What might easily be the biggest war since 1945.

One hopes that if ever the decision must be faced and taken, it would be based on realistic ideas of what was involved. If it was, I think the answer would almost certainly be no. It is possible to imagine circumstances in which it would, even so, be right to go to war, as it Was right to go to war in 1939. But whether it would be right in the circumstances of a US—China clash in Asia over Taiwan, say, is very far from clear. And it is absolutely clear that Australia’s decision should not be delegated to Donald Trump of all people.

Of course, no one in Canberra wants or expects a war with China. The muddled thinking behind our posturing is that it will help deter China in its push for regional leadership and leave the region as we’d like it to be, in peace and under US leadership. But the thought that if all else fails, America’s primacy could and would be preserved by armed force nonetheless does a lot to underpin our leaders’ confidence that, come what may, we will never find ourselves living in an Asia dominated by China. This is a big mistake because, as we have seen, America has no real reason to fight China for primacy in Asia, shows little real interest in doing so and has no chance of succeeding if it tries. Until our leaders realise that, they will not address the reality that we are, most probably, soon going to find ourselves in an Asia dominated by China, Where America plays little or no strategic role at all.