From Leaderless Jihad (Marc Sageman, 2008) p175-8
Deny the Acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The NSCT correctly singles out the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism for special consideration. The scenarios the NSCT considers, however, are too focused on terrorism gaining WMD from rogue states and too dismissive of the principles of deterrence. The NSCT does not analyze the possibility that terrorists, whether Muslim or not, could acquire WMD without relying on a state sponsor. The recommendations are based on hypothetical worst-case scenarios and surprisingly ignore the empirical data on terrorism using WMD.
The difficulties of generating a nuclear device have so far prevented terrorists from seriously embarking on this path. Several terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have shown great interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, but they have not gone beyond that point. The far more serious threat in terms of both feasibility and destructive potential is from live biological agents (as opposed to biologically derived poisons) used as terrorist tools. In the past century, there have been six such non-state-sponsored serious attempts to use biological weapons: RISE in Chicago in 1972, the Rajneeshees in Oregon in 1984, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan (in 1990, 1993, and 1995), Larry Wayne Harris in Ohio and Las Vegas in 1995 and 1998, respectively, al Qaeda in 2000 and 2001 in Afghanistan, and the still unsolved anthrax cases in the United States in the fall of 2001. Only the last instance resulted in fatalities. With the exception of al Qaeda, none of the groups or individuals started out as terrorist groups. RISE was an ad hoc extreme environmentalist duo, and the Rajneeshees and Aum Shinrikyo were cults. Nor did all of them have an apocalyptic ideology, nor could they be deterred. Indeed, as police were closing in on RISE and Aum Shinrikyo, they accelerated their operations rather than abandoned them.
The odds are that a WMD attack on the United States might come not from any of the well-known terrorist groups, which are already monitored by law enforcement authorities, but from an informal group that is not yet the focus of such scrutiny. This group might very well fly under the radar of authorities, and the strategy contained in the NSCT may prove ineffective against such an informal group. Detection will instead come from local law enforcement, which might not have the expertise – present in federal agencies – to recognize and correctly interpret what they see on the ground. Local coordination was crucial in Chicago in 1972, Oregon in 1984, and in Japan in the early 1990s; greater resources for foreign intelligence would not have detected any of these cases. To protect against WMD terrorism, we need much closer coordination between federal expertise and local police on this issue.
Even if a terrorist group were able to obtain a nuclear device and explode it, the attack would not threaten the existence of the United States. However, the reaction to such an attack could. This was the purpose of the Aum Shinrikyo attacks in the 1990s: to trigger a global war, which the cult believed it would survive. After a WMD attack, the pressure in a democracy to “do something” immediately would be overwhelming. The outraged public would demand instant retaliation against any enemy, even if it turned out to be the wrong one – as was the case with the false accusation against Iraq of involvement in the 9/11 plot. This reaction, especially if it is a nuclear strike against a traditional enemy of the United States, might escalate into a global nuclear exchange, which would be much worse than the original attack and potentially threaten the existence of the human race.
To avert such a nightmare scenario, new mechanisms must be immediately put in place. The nuclear powers need to revisit the question of nuclear war. The cold war doctrine of mutually assured destruction as the deterrent against retaliatory nuclear attacks may prove obsolete in the event of a terrorist nuclear detonation. A different strategy must be put in place that will satisfy the demands of rightfully outraged crowds in the victim state and bring the perpetrators to justice in a fair and just way. There must be immediate and transparent international cooperation to avert an even greater tragedy.
Although I focus on the WMD threats from terrorists who happen to be Muslim, we need to consider that an even greater threat may be awaiting us. Global Islamist terrorists have argued that their beliefs can legitimate the use of WMD in certain circumstances. So, too, have radical environmentalist extremists, who make the case that humans are destroying the world through pollution, global warming, and overuse of national resources and that the only way to preserve the earth and the human race is to eradicate a large portion of the world population. Such logic practically invites the use of biological agents, for no other weapon has the potential to kill so efficiently. We must not allow our obsessive focus on the horrors caused by a wave of terrorism perpetrated by a small group of radical Muslims to blind us against the potentially far more cataclysmic devastation engineered by a completely different type of terrorism chat could threaten the existence of the human race.
Conclusion
The complexity of the recommendations should alert the reader that there is no simple solution to fight global Islamist terrorism. The strategy is composed of multiple steps under an overarching idea of homeland security, defending the population.
It is important to take the glory out of terrorism by demilitarizing the conflict except for sanctuary denial and by reducing terrorists to the status of common criminals. Diminishing Muslim moral outrage can be accomplished globally by withdrawing from Iraq and locally through restraint in the aftermath of terrorism operations. The battle for the hearts and minds of the Muslim community must be based on the promotion of peaceful local heroes who can inspire young Muslims to emulate them. Muslims who reject violence should also join the battle online and confront terrorist sympathizers with the horrors perpetrated in their name. The worldwide media should give far more play to prominent Muslim leaders who censure terrorism. The majority view should be that terrorism is simply beyond the pale and must be rejected.
The West should regain the moral high ground and condemn any atrocity or persecution committed by any government, including some of our staunchest allies in the Middle East, often in the name of the “war on terror”. In Europe the elimination of discrimination and economic exclusion against Muslims would strongly undermine the Islamist terrorist appeal. Current terrorist networks must be eradicated through good community policing. Once arrested, alleged terrorists are entitled to due process and the impartial application of justice in order to win over the worldwide Muslim community and refute claims that Muslims are treated unfairly.
The strategy to counter global Islamist terrorism must be strongly grounded in scientific empirical research. It is important for the Western governments to restructure their funding strategy in order to support relevant research. Finally, denial of weapons of mass destruction must remain a critical priority for every government. But despite all precautions taken, we must still face the possibility of the unthinkable and put into place right now a mechanism that would prevent the even greater disaster of overreaction that could trigger the annihilation of a large part of the human race.
Because the threat of al Qaeda is self-limiting in terms of both structural capability and appeal, homeland security is best accomplished through a strategy of bringing to justice real terrorism, containing potential terrorists, and exercising restraint with respect to the Muslim community. Only then will the leaderless jihad expire, poisoned by its own toxic message.
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