From The End Game (Rush Doshi, 2021) pp 323-5
Blunting Chinese order building at low cost may work in many domains, but it is not sustainable without efforts to simultaneously reinvest in the foundations of American order, China too has pursued a blunting strategy that targets American advantages at the regional and global level, and it requires a US effort to recommit to those advantages. Within the military domain, China’s pursuit of so-called anti-access/area denial capabilities blunts US intervention in Asia and undermines a major source of American regional influence and leverage. At the economic level China’s use of economic statecraft — both through the Belt and Road Initiative and through economic coercion — blunts relative US economic leverage. Beijing is also targeting the foundations of US financial power with a new digital sovereign currency, as well as the foundations of US technology dominance with aggressive industrial policy. Finally, at the political level, China is increasingly gaining influence over global bodies in ways that leave them either dysfunctional or in some cases instruments of Beijing’s foreign policy, blunting the advantages that the United States had generated within them.
For the United States, building order is more costly than blunting it, so aspects of this strategy will be more symmetrical than the efforts outlined in the previous section; nonetheless, judicious investment in key foundations of US strength and coordination with allies where possible to diffuse the costs of order-building and maintenance — can ensure resources are used more conservatively.
China has pursued efforts to blunt American military power in the Western Pacific. For example, China’s air-launched cruise missiles and ground-launched ballistic missiles can strike bases as far away as Guam, crippling runways, destroying fuel facilities, and disabling aircraft on the tarmac. In response, the United States should make a number of investments — many of which are well understood but have lacked adequate resourcing — to build resilience against China’s denial capabilities. These include hardening critical facilities; burying fuel or information infrastructure deep underground; acquiring capabilities for rapid movement between bases or across the first and second island chains; expanding runways and improving runaway repair capabilities; significantly expanding stockpiles of critical munitions; and increasing the use of camouflage, concealment, and deception; among other methods.
Build a Diverse US Posture in the Indo-Pacific:
US military bases in Asia are increasingly vulnerable to disabling missile attacks. Resilience requires a more dispersed posture across the region, as well as a demonstrated capability to rapidly move forces across it. Distributing US assets across a number of bases in different countries and outlying islands would not solve this problem entirely, but it would mitigate some of the danger posed by consolidating US forces in a few locations. Presently, and as a legacy of the Cold War, the United States posture in Asia is overweighted toward Northeast Asia and underweighted with respect to Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Islands, and Oceania. Some of these steps are already underway, but more could be taken — including facilities in Palau and Yap among other locations. Moreover, US force posture should not involve only permanent bases but should increasingly include a variety of access and status of forces agreements that can also be useful in diversifying military posture to “low-cost, small footprint” facilities while providing the United States the ability to respond nimbly to faraway regional crises. Finally, a more diversified force posture will facilitate US access in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, afford more opportunities for military diplomacy from India to Vietnam and the Pacific Islands, and provide some insurance from political risk.
« Build Resilient Information Infrastructure:
US military operations in Asia and worldwide are especially dependent on resilient information flows for command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).. For example, precision-guided munitions will be far less effective in striking their targets without access to information. Much of this information architecture was established in an era that presumed opponents would not be able to effectively challenge it, and it now needs to be rebuilt to address the challenge posed by China. In many cases, this may mean investing in alternatives to space assets for communication or positioning, navigation, and timing; innovative ISR systems that mass sensors and collaborate in contested environments; improvements in artificial intelligence and autonomy that reduce dependence on information flows; continued innovation in electronic warfare; and training to operate in environments where C4ISR may be degraded. Some analysts suggest that improving the resilience of U.S. C4ISR architecture in the face of attack might be the single most effective step the United States can take to strengthen its conventional deterrent.
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