From China Panic (David Brophy, 2021) pp 77-8
What does America derive from its military relationship with Australia? Primarily, a convenient location for a string of intelligence and military facilities. A recent study identifies seven such ‘joint facilities, including the Pine Gap satellite station, the North West Cape naval communications station, the Shoal Bay Receiving Station outside of Darwin and a satellite communication facility east of Geraldton.’* Long justified in terms of arms control and surveillance of Soviet nuclear testing, these facilities now provide signals intelligence and satellite data for a range of offensive activities. Since the 1980s, Australia has claimed to have ‘full knowledge and concurrence’ of all activities on its soil, but this formula only gives the government knowledge as to the purpose of these activities, not the details of specific actions. In his 2019 speech, Pyne sought to reassure Australians ‘that these activities are undertaken in accordance with Australian and international law, but we know for a fact that Pine Gap supports America’s extrajudicial drone strikes.’
This state of affairs represents a serious compromise of Australian sovereignty, one far more serious than anything China is said to have been responsible for in recent times. Given the intelligence and communications role that the ‘joint facilities’ will play in any future American confrontation with China, it is hard to say whether Australia will actually have any choice about whether to involve itself in such a confrontation or not. For example, in the event of a conflict with China, America’s fleet of nuclear submarines will receive targeting and firing instructions from the North West Cape. Australia’s reliance on America’s willingness to use nuclear weapons also calls into question Australia’s commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has prevented it signing the recent United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
But Australia doesn’t risk becoming embroiled in a war not of its own choosing simply to obtain US intelligence and arms, Nor is that the justification for its internationally unpopular pro-nuclear posture. Pyne’s speech to parliament failed to mention what is probably the chief value of ANZUS to Australian strategic thinkers today: its symbolic role in retaining ‘the American presence we need in the East Asian Time Zone, to cite Marles again. Allowing US facilities on Australian soil serves the same end.