From The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (Martin Wolf 2022)
Martin Sandbu of the Financial Times has concluded—on the evidence, correctly: “What has really happened both in Sweden and elsewhere is that anti-immigrant and illiberal sentiments have been drawn into political service by rising economic insecurity. Even if such attitudes existed, more or less latently, in the past, it is economic change that has turned them into a political force.” 74 Yet while economic forces played an important part in the shift toward populist parties and leaders, they do not explain why populists of the right were more successful than the parties of the left in attracting the support of disenchanted members of the old working class. For this, there are three plausible explanations. First, the established left-of-center parties had largely bought into the economic agenda associated with the disappointed expectations and the financial crisis. They also did not put forward any fundamentally different prospectus from what had been on offer. Second, where that establishment was overthrown by something more revolutionary, as with Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership of the Labour Party, it looked a great deal like old-fashioned socialism. By and large, today’s working class does not believe it will benefit from an upheaval that seems likely merely to replace corporate bosses with public sector bureaucrats. Indeed, few of them still believe in radical forms of socialism. Finally, the culturally dominant element in left-of-center parties increasingly consists of graduates, academics, public sector workers, journalists and creative workers, the young, and ethnic minorities. The older and more socially conservative, patriotic, and increasingly disadvantaged members of the working class see little in such parties to attract them. Health shocks may also spark political extremism. A recent study looked at the impact of Spanish flu on Italian politics in the early 1920s, noting 4.1 million Italians contracted the disease and about 500,000 died. It tested the hypothesis that deaths from the 1918 influenza pandemic contributed to the rise of fascism in Italy. “Our observations,” it stated, “were consistent with evidence from other contexts that worsening mortality rates can fuel radical politics. Unequal impacts of pandemics may contribute to political polarization.” 75 The COVID pandemic has indeed been divisive on many dimensions. Among other things, it has created intense political divisions over social distancing, lockdowns, mask wearing, and vaccination. In an environment of fear, anxiety, and stress, support for political extremism again seems likely to increase.”