From Autocracy, Inc. (Anne Applebaum, 2024) pp30-1
By 1992, the year Shadkhan interviewed the future Russian president, Putin was already the executor and probably the prime beneficiary of a scheme designed to steal money from the city of St. Petersburg. His original swindle has now been investigated and described many times-inside Russia, initially, by the St. Petersburg City Council; outside Russia, by Dawisha, Belton, Masha Gessen, and others—and it was relatively straightforward. In his role as deputy mayor, Putin issued export licenses for raw materials such as diesel fuel, cement, and fertilizer. These shipments, purchased at low state prices in Russia, were meant to be sold at higher prices abroad in order to purchase food. The goods were indeed sold, but the money disappeared, diverted into the bank accounts of an obscure group of companies owned by Putin’s friends and colleagues.
More complex schemes soon followed. They involved property in Russia, shell companies in Spain, Russian-Finnish joint ventures, German cutouts, and bank accounts in many different countries, probably including accounts that had been created years earlier. Like the St. Petersburg food swindle, the story of these investments and schemes has been told before. But usually, the emphasis is on the Russian actors and the Russian victims. Here I would like to draw attention to an aspect of Putin’s origin story that is mentioned less frequently: the role of the legitimate Western institutions, companies, lawyers, and politicians who enabled his schemes, profited from them, or covered them up. The deputy mayor of St. Petersburg made his money thanks to the Western companies that bought the exports, the Western regulators who were unbothered by the bad contracts, and the Western banks that were strangely lacking in curiosity about the new streams of cash flowing into their accounts.
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